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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues
This memorandum of law will address issues regarding potential amnesty and asylum
exceptions to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Specifically, this
memorandum will analyze whether it would be an inappropriate use of prosecutorial discretion if
the Prosecutor of the ICC declined to initiate an investigation in the case of an individual who
has been granted amnesty or asylum. Part II of this memorandum sets the jurisdictional and
procedural background of the ICC. Part III of this memorandum analyzes sources of
international law external to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome
Statute”) and considers the prosecutorial obligations imposed by those international sources of
law. Part IV discusses the treatment by both the Rome Statute and external sources of law
regarding of grants of amnesty and considers whether there is an amnesty exception to the ICC’s
jurisdiction. Part V applies an analysis similar to that undertaken in Part IV; Part V, however,
analyzes a potential asylum exception to the ICC’s jurisdiction.

B. Summary of Conclusions
1)
There are very few obligations imposed on international judicial bodies to
initiate investigations.
International law generally imposes no obligations to initiate investigations or prosecutoe
cases on international bodies such as the ICC or the ICJ. There are certain conventions of
international law, such as the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and the Torture
Convention, that impose absolute obligations to prosecute grave breaches or violations of said
conventions. Those obligations, however, are only imposed on states, and may further be limited
to parties to those treaties, depending on the specific convention. Since the ICC is not a state nor
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is it a party to these conventions, there are very few obligations to investigate or prosecute
violators of those conventions imposed upon the ICC.

2)

There is no explicit amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the ICC. There
are, however, a number of provisions into which an amnesty exception may
be read.

The Rome Statute does not explicitly recognize an amnesty exception to the ICC’s
jurisdiction. There are a number of provisions of the Rome Statute into which an amnesty
exception may be implied, specifically Articles 15, 16, 17, 20, 53 and 119. Given the
prosecutorial flexibility provided by Articles 15 and 53, the Prosecutor has the ability to
recognize an amnesty exception to the ICC’s jurisdiction at the Prosecutor’s discretion.

3)

There is no explicit asylum exception to the jurisdiction of the ICC, and the
Rome Statute provides only a limited basis in which such an exception may
be read. Sources of international law outside of the Rome Statute may
provide scenarios in which a prosecutor may decline to initiate an
investigation based on a grant of asylum.

Much like the Rome Statute’s treatment of amnesty, the Rome Statute is silent on the
explicit recognition of an asylum exception to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, there are
fewer provisions of the Rome Statute into which an exception may be read, and reading an
exception into those provisions is attenuated at best. The Refugee Convention may, however,
provide the prosecutor with the discretion to recognize an asylum exception in limited
circumstances. That said, given the Prosecutor’s wide discretion in deciding which cases to
bring before the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor might be able read an asylum exception in
limited circumstances.

7

II. ICC JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES
A. ICC Jurisdiction
The ICC has been given jurisdiction over four types of international crimes: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The crime of genocide is
defined by the Rome Statute as committing any of the listed acts “with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”1 Crimes against humanity includes the
performance of any of the codified acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”2 War crimes include
crimes listed under Article 8 committed “as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.”3 The crime of aggression is not provided an explicit definition in
the Rome Statute. Instead, the Rome Statute allows jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once a finding has been made in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute.4

B. ICC Procedures
1) Initiating Investigations
The general provisions regarding the course of conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor
are contained in Article 15 of the Rome Statute. The Office of the Prosecutor, in making
decisions regarding whether to initiate an investigation into a particular set of circumstance, is
bound by the provisions of Articles 15 and 53 of the Rome Statute.

1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 6. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

2

Id. at art. 7.

3

Id. at art. 8.

4

Id. at art. 5(2).
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Potential cases are brought to the Office of the Prosecutor in three different ways. First,
the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation at the Prosecutor’s own discretion. Second, the
Prosecutor may initiate an investigation at the request of a state that is a party to the Rome
Statute.5 Third, a case may be brought to the attention of the Office of the Prosecutor by the UN
Security Council under the Security Council’s powers enumerated in chapter VII of the UN
Charter.6 Any one of these procedures are acceptable ways to bring a case under the ICC’s
jurisdiction.
Once a case has been brought to the Office of the Prosecutor by a State Party or the
Security Council, the Prosecutor must decide whether to initiate an investigation into the case.
The Office of the Prosecutor is obligated to initiate an investigation under Article 53 of the Rome
Statute unless the Office of the Prosecutor determines that there is “no reasonable basis to
proceed” with such an investigation.7 In determining whether there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with the investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor must take three considerations into
account.8
First, the Prosecutor must consider whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that a
crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC has been committed.9 The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to
cases of alleged genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.10

5

Id. at art.13(a).

6

Id. at art.13(b).

7

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art.53. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

8

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 53(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

9

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 53(1)(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

10

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 5(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

9

Second, the Prosecutor must determine whether the case would be admissible under
Article 17 of the Rome Statute.11 Article 17 outlines the admissibility of cases before the ICC.
There are four situations in which a case before the ICC is inadmissible. The first such situation
is where the case at issue is being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over
the case at issue.12 A second set of circumstances in which the a case may be determined
inadmissible is if where the case has been investigated by the state that has jurisdiction over the
case and the state declined to prosecute the defendant further.13 Admissibility issues may also
arise if the person being investigated has already been tried for activities that comprise the issue
of the complaint before the ICC, or if a trial by the ICC is impermissible under Article 20 of the
Rome Statute.14 Finally, a case may be inadmissible before the ICC where the circumstances of
the case are not of “sufficient gravity” to warrant further proceedings by the ICC.15

11

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art.53(1)(b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

12

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art.17(1)(a). A state’s jurisdiction in this type of situation may be preempted if the State
that has jurisdiction over the case is either “unwilling or unable genuinely” to conduct the proceedings. Id.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

13

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 17(1)(b). Again, the inadmissibility of these circumstances may also be preempted
if there are issues concerning whether the state with jurisdiction was either unwilling or unable to conduct a genuine
prosecution. Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

14

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 17(1)(c), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Under Article 20, the
ICC cannot conduct a trial of a person who was tried by another court for the same activities. The ICC may still
subject a person to prosecution if the previous court’s proceedings were either for the purpose of shielding the
person from prosecution by the ICC or were not conducted in a manner that is consistent with the norms of due
process and justice that are recognized by international law. [Article 20(3)] [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].

15

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 17(1)(d_. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Third, the Prosecutor must consider whether the initiation of an investigation would “serve the
interests of justice.”16 This consideration relies heavily on the subjective judgment of the
Prosecutor.

2) Proceeding with Prosecutions
Before the ICC can proceed with a prosecution, there are preliminary procedures that
must be satisfied in order to ensure the legitimacy of the Prosecutor’s decision. The
investigation itself is subject to the provisions of Article 54, which establishes basic due process
protections regarding the collection of evidence and formulation of the prosecution’s case.17
If the Prosecutor decides that a particular case warrants an investigation, the Prosecutor
must make a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of an investigation.18 The PreTrial Chamber will go through its own analysis of the case in determining whether the
Prosecution’s request for authorization should be granted.19 If the prosecutor declines an
investigation, the decision not to investigate may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the
Chamber’s discretion.20 If the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that a review of the Prosecutor’s
decision not to initiate an investigation is necessary, the investigation may not proceed unless the

16

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 53, cl.1(c). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

17

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 54. Article 54 allows the Prosecutor to take a number of different measures to collect
information during an investigation such as the negotiation of agreements to ensure the cooperation of a State or an
individual. Additionally, Article 54 requires the Prosecutor to ensure that the “necessary measures be taken” to
protect the confidentiality of information. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2]

18

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 15, cl. 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

19

See Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 15, cl. 4. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s analysis is similar to the Prosecutor’s
analysis. The Pre-Trial Chamber must consider the factual basis of the case and the jurisdiction of the ICC in
deciding whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation. Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].

20

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 53, cl.3 (b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

11

Pre-Trial Chamber has confirmed the initiation of the investigation.21 Furthermore, if the
Prosecutor declines to initiate an investigation, Article 53 allows the Prosecutor the discretion to
reconsider a decision not to initiate an investigation on the presentation of new facts or
information.22

3) Prosecutorial Timing
The timing of an investigation can have a significant effect on the political and legal
effects of the decision to either request or decline to initiate an investigation. The Office of the
Prosecutor is given wide latitude in determining when to bring investigations and when to delay
the initiation of an investigation.
There are a few provisions of the Rome Statute that are particularly important in regards
to the delaying the initiation of an investigation or prosecution. First, Article 16 allows the UN
Security Council to order the Office of the Prosecutor to delay an investigation or a prosecution
by invoking the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers under the UN Charter.23 Article 16
establishes that the Prosecutor may not institute proceedings against an individual for twelve
months if the UN Security Council requests such a deferral.24 This provision of the UN Charter
allows the Security Council to give legal effect to the prosecutor’s decision to delay an
investigation. This is a particularly important provision, as Article 16 allows the Prosecutor to
employ the authority of the UN Security Council in resolving political considerations that may
arise in the decision whether to initiate an investigation. When the decision to initiate an
21

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2 ]

22

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 53, cl.4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

23

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 16. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

24

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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investigation may not be politically advisable, the UN Security Council may request a twelvemonth deferral, and then renew that request at the Security Council’s discretion. The only
limitation on the Security Council is that they may only invoke their Chapter VII powers if the
Security Council feels that there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.”25
Article 54 of the Rome Statute governs the initiation of investigations by the Prosecutor.
In regards to the issue of delaying investigations, the Prosecutor is given the ability, under
Article 17(1)(b), to “take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests
and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses.”26 This provision arguably allows the
Prosecutor a great deal of latitude in considering extraneous circumstances in conducting
investigations. Under Article 17(1)(b), it may be argued that if the Prosecutor feels that the
initiation of an investigation at a particular time would be antithetical to the interests of all
affected parties, the Prosecutor may “take all appropriate measures,” which may include delaying
an investigation. The Prosecutor’s decision to delay an investigation may be given additional
legal authority if the Prosecutor delays the initiation of an investigation at the behest of the UN
Security Council pursuant to Article 16.
The only limitation on delaying the initiation of an investigation falls under Article 17 of
the Rome Statute. Article 17 establishes the types of cases that would be considered
inadmissible before the ICC. Article 17 also establishes when a state would be considered
“unwilling” to bring an individual to justice. One such scenario is discussed in Article 17(2): a

25

UN Charter, art. 39. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1 ].

26

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 17(1)(b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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party is considered “unwilling” when “there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.”27 Whether this is binding on the Office of the Prosecutor is questionable at best; it is
important to note that Article 17(2) only applies to state parties.28

27

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 17(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

28

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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II. OBLIGATIONS TO INVESTIGATE
A. Obligations Rising out of International Law Conventions
The Prosecutor of the ICC has wide discretion as to whether to initiate an investigation
into a particular case. The Prosecutor is obligated under Article 53 of the Rome Statute to
request initiation of an investigation unless the Prosecutor finds that doing so would compromise
justice.
The same discretion cannot be ascribed to state parties to international conventions. In
international law, there are three types of crimes for which the international community has a
general obligation to enforce: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,29 violations of the
Torture Convention,30 and violations of the Genocide Convention.31 The obligations to
prosecute violations of these international treaties generally fall on the states who are parties to
those international treaties. More specifically, it is often the obligation of either the host state or
the state where the violations of international law occurred to ensure that these international
conventions are enforced. Sometimes, the obligation is universal, meaning that the obligation is
not limited to the host state or the state whether the violations of international law occurred. The
obligation on state parties to enforce these conventions is generally absolute, meaning the state
parties must initiate investigations or prosecutions into violations of these conventions regardless
of whether amnesty or asylum has been granted.
These obligations are not extended to the ICC. The obligation to investigate or prosecute
violations of the aforementioned conventions fall on state parties and not on the ICC. The
29

Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
Yale L.J. 2537, 2566(1991). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

30

Id.

31

Id. at 2564.
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reasons for not extending these obligations to the ICC vary depending on the particular
convention.

1) Geneva Conventions
The “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions are specifically codified in Article 130
of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”).32
Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an absolute obligation: if the host state cannot prosecute
individuals accused of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, that state is obligated to turn
those individuals over to other state parties that are willing to carry out the prosecutorial
obligations.33
While there is an international obligation to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, that obligation is not extended to the ICC. This obligation is not extended to the
ICC for several reasons. First, the Geneva Conventions only impose obligations only on state
parties to the Conventions to prosecute grave breaches.34 Second, even though the ICC uses the
Conventions’ definition of grave breaches,35 the ICC does not incorporate the procedural
provisions on the duty to prosecute grave breaches.36 The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to the the

32

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (III). art. 130. The article provides that the
following acts are considered “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions: “willful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of
the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this convention.” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

33

Id. at art. 129. Note that this obligation to turn over an individual accused of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions is subject to extradition laws, the scope of which are not examined by this memorandum.

34

This is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

35

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 8(2). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

36

Rome Statute, supra 1, at art. 8. Note that the Rome Statute only makes reference to the elements of crimes under
the Geneva Conventions. There is no explicit language incorporating the procedural provisions of the Geneva
Conventions. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute; there is no language in the Rome Statute indicating an
extension of the grave breaches provisions into the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Rome Statute
left the obligation to enforce the Geneva Conventions to those states that are parties to the
conventions.37 Since the Rome Statute does not incorporate the grave breaches provisions of the
Geneva Conventions into its jurisdiction, the obligation to prosecute grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions does not extend to the ICC.

2) Torture Convention
The Convention Against Torture was crafted to curb the use of torture by state bodies,38
so it is instructive to read the Torture Convention in regards to the obligations it places on state
bodies as opposed to multilateral international organizations. Much like the grave breaches
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention places explicit obligations on
state parties to prosecute crimes violations of the Torture Convention.39 Not only does the
Torture Convention establish obligations on state parties to ensure freedom from torture, the
Convention also provides for universal jurisdiction on all state parties to the convention over acts
constituting violations of the Torture Convention.40 Furthermore, like the grave breaches

37

The Rome Statute does incorporate the principle of complementarity. The jurisdiction of the ICC is expressly
complementary to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. It may be argued that the ICC may have an obligation to
invoke complementarity and assert jurisdiction where domestic courts have proven either unwilling to prosecute or
ineffective in providing legitimate enforcement proceedings. If there is such an obligation on the ICC, it is not an
absolute obligation. The decision to request initiation of an investigation still falls on the Office of the Prosecutor,
and it is up to the Office of the Prosecutor to determine whether ICC intervention is necessary.
38

Orentlicher, supra 30, at 2567. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab ].

39

Orentlicher, supra 30, at 2566. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab ].

40

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. _, G.A. Res.
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provisions, these obligations are imposed only on states that are parties to the Convention, not
upon international organizations or states that are not parties to the Convention.41
This obligation to prosecute all violations of the Torture Convention does not extend to
the ICC. There may be an obligation on the ICC, however, to request an investigation into acts
of torture arising to the level of crimes against humanity. The ICC’s jurisdiction extends to
violations of the Torture Convention with respect to Crimes Against Humanity, which include
systematic acts of torture. While there is no obligation to prosecute with respect to Crimes
Against Humanity in general, systematic acts of torture are an exception to this general rule.
Therefore, the ICC may have an obligation under the Torture Convention to at least request an
investigation into systematic acts of torture.

3) Genocide Convention
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”) establishes explicit obligations on state parties to prosecute crimes against the
human rights provisions of the Convention:


Article III: Various forms of participation in genocide that “shall be punishable;”42



Article V: Parties to the Genocide Convention must enact legislation that ensures
“effective” penalties for persons guilty of genocide;”



41

Article VI: Establishing an international tribunal to try crimes of genocide.43

Id. at art. _ .

42
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Unlike the Geneva Conventions, which establish a universal obligation to prosecute on
all parties to the Conventions, under Article IV of the Genocide Convention, the duty to
prosecute is imposed only on the State where the acts of genocide occurred.44 While the
Genocide Convention also provides for an international tribunal established for the purpose of
prosecuting such violations of the convention, the duty to prosecute these violations is imposed
only upon the territorial state.45 Where the territorial state which is a party to the Rome Statute
provides inadequate judicial proceedings or is unable to produce genuine investigations or
prosecutions, it may be argued that the ICC is obligated under Article 17(1)(a) to request the
initiation of an investigation into the alleged acts.46 In such a case, it can be argued that the
authority to prosecute genocide and the duty to do so are both simultaneously delegated to the
ICC. Therefore, under this analysis, the ICC would be obligated to consider a request to initiate
an investigation into violations of the Genocide Convention where the territorial state cannot
produce legitimate proceedings.
There are very few obligations on the ICC to prosecute certain crimes arising out of
international conventions. The Geneva Conventions do not impose an obligation on the ICC to
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; that obligation is only imposed on state
parties to the Conventions. The ICC may be obligated to request an initiation of an investigation
into systematic acts of torture under the Torture Convention. The ICC may also be obligated to
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initate an investigation into violations of the Genocide Convention where the territorial state is
either unable or unwilling to institute legitimate accountability proceedings.

B. Obligations Rising out of Customary International Law
Notwithstanding obligations that may be imposed on the ICC through international
conventions, the ICC may be obligated to conduct certain proceedings pursuant to norms of
customary international law.
If a practice is to be considered a norm of customary international law, the practice must
satisfy two requirements. First, the practice must be extensive among states worldwide.47 This
does not mean that the practice need be universal, but it must be such that the state practice is
general and fairly consistent throughout the world.48 Second, in order to arise to the level of
customary international law, the state practice arise out of a sense of legal obligation known as
opinio juris. When a norm of international law is determined to have satisfied these two
requirements, the norm will be considered customary international law, and thus will apply to all
states.
Whether customary international actually imposes obligations on the ICC to investigate
or prosecute certain cases is difficult to determine. The ICC is not a state, so it is questionable
whehter customary obligations imposed upon states also apply to the ICC. It has been suggested
that if an obligation to investigate or prosecute certain cases does exist, it arises out of a

47

NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, 39 (1995).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
48

Id.

20

combination of treaties whose provisions arise to the level of customary international law and
international diplomatic practice.49

1) Treaties rising to the Status of Customary International Law
It may be argued that human rights treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, impose binding obligations
on the ICC. These treaties may constitute binding customary international law on all states, but
since the ICC is not a state, the ICC’s customary international law obligations are unsettled.
There is little doubt that customary international law imposes binding obligations on
states worldwide. It is questionable whether obligations of customary international law extend to
multilateral international organizations like the United Nations or the ICC. It is noteworthy that
in creating the ICTY, the Report of the UN Secretary-General stressed that the international
tribunal would have to act in accordance with Article 14 of the International Covenany on Civil
and Political Rights, which reflected customary international law.50 It may be argued that the
role of international authorities such as the United Nations or the ICC is obligatory when a state
is either unable or unwilling to provide adequate proceedings. The Rome Statute incorporates
the “complementarity” principle into the ICC’s jurisdiction.51 The principle of complementarity
requires international jurisdiction to be secondary to domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, under
complementarity, the ICC can only asserted jurisdiction over obligations left to state parties in a
fashion complementary to the jurisdiction of a state bound by customary international law. If
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there is an obligation on the ICC to prosecute violations of human rights treaties constituting
customary international law, it must be considered secondary to the obligations of states.

2) State Practice
Occasionally, states other than the host state step in and initiate proceedings against
offenders where the host state is unable or unwilling to carry out its obligations under
international law. This state practice, however, has not been consistent enough to constitute a
norm of international law.52 While host countries rarely proclaim that they do not recognize
certain obligations to prosecute crimes of international humanitarian law, some countries may
not be enthusiastic about carrying out their customary international law obligations in practice.53
Furthermore, many countries would like to preserve the option of negotiating amnestyfor-peace deals.54 The practice of amnesty-for-peace deals is antithetical to the idea of state
obligations to initiate investigations and prosecutions in that the obligations to prosecute are
ignored in favor of more practical political measures. Either way, the argument that state
practice imposes binding obligations on the ICC to prosecute certain crimes through customary
international law is dubious.
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III. ANALYSIS OF A POTENTIAL AMNESTY EXCEPTION TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. International Use of Amnesties
Amnesties are recognized as legitimate exercise of state discretion. As previously
mentioned, the use of amnesties in resolving disputes has become an accepted practice in
international affairs. Amnesties, however, are given for a variety of motivations. Amnesties will
typically be given to promote peaceful relations between parties or states.55 A state may decide
to protect individual members of its administration from international prosecution by granting an
amnesty. An international organization may grant amnesties as part of a negotiated agreement to
facilitate a transfer of power or an end to hostilities.56
Amnesties may have the effect of precluding prosecution for certain crimes. This
preclusion, however, does not effectively make amnesties substitutes for criminal prosecutions.
Instead, the recent trend has been towards viewing amnesties as supplements to negotiated
agreements rather than substitutions for criminal liability.57

1) Amnesty under International Law
International law documents are silent on the issue of amnesty; under most international
law instruments, amnesties are neither expressly allowed nor are they expressly prohibited.58
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Instead, there is a gap between what the law expressly provides and typical state practice. Even
though nothing in international law expressly prohibits the granting of amnesties to individual
parties, it seems clear that a state cannot grant amnesties for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, or violations of either the Genocide Convention or the Convention Against Torture
if the state is a party to those conventions.59 Granting amnesty to such violators would itself be a
violation of the state’s obligations under the those conventions.60 The most recent trend of
international institutions seems to be towards recognizing that certain types of amnesties are
patently illegal under international law.61
A notable exception is Article 6(5) of Protocol II for the Geneva Conventions (“Geneva
II”). Article 6(5) expressly provides that “at the end of hostilities, the authorities…shall
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict.”62 The legal authority to grant amnesties under even this provision has come under fire.
It has been suggested that the authority to grant amnesties under Article 6(5) applies not to
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individual violations of international human rights law, but instead bears a closer resemblance to
combatant immunity than individual criminal responsibility.63
Beyond this provision of Geneva II, most international law documents are silent on the
use of amnesties.64 The trend in international law seems to be towards recognizing a requirement
to prosecute individuals accused of certain crimes, an idea that is antithetical to the concepts
behind amnesties.65 A distinction between blanket amnesties and individual pardons must be
emphasized. Generally, blanket amnesties are not endorsed by international law because they
are given without investigations into specific cases like individual pardons.

2) Granting Amnesties – Policy Concerns
State practice throughout the twentieth century has given rise to the amnesty for peace
phenomenon. Under this practice, a grant of amnesty is given to civil and political leaders in the
interests of ensuring peace or democratic transition.66 The ability to grant amnesty to civil and
political leaders has become collateral for international organizations negotiating for peace in
63
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armed conflicts.67 To that end, it has become necessary to preserve of grants of amnesty for the
purposes of being able to use such amnesties as collateral for peaceful settlements. To
international negotiators, preemption through the prosecution of individuals who have been
previously granted amnesties eliminates the viability of such amnesty for peace deals especially
when the amnesties have no legal effect.68 As such, amnesty for peace deals have become an
essential element of international public policy.
Generally speaking, blanket amnesties are pardons given to a large number of people or
to a particular class of people pursuant to their affiliation with that particular class. Blanket
amnesties are given without regard to individual criminal or civil liability; instead, such
amnesties are given to members of a group or class. Blanket amnesties may resemble El
Salvador’s National Reconciliation Act, which provides an amnesty for people involved in
criminal activities related to political offenses.69 El Salvador is hardly alone in its use of blanket
amnesties; similar grants have also been implemented in Argentina, Cambodia, Chile,
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Guatemala, Haiti, and Uruguay.70 These blanket amnesties have been criticized for sacrificing
justice and the interests of victims in favor of an unstable peace.71
Not all international parties have condemned the use of blanket amnesties. Some
international organizations have advocated the negotiation of blanket amnesties in amnesty for
peace deals. In particular, the United Nations has taken an active role in the negotiation of a
number of blanket amnesties in the name of preserving peace and democratic government.72
Political considerations aside, the granting of blanket amnesties seems to directly
contradict a state’s obligation to prosecute certain violations of international humanitarian law.
Blanket amnesties are particularly dubious in that they disregard the considerations of each
individual case. Blanket amnesties are often granted to a number of people who may or may not
all be accused of the same crimes. Some members of the amnestied class may be accused of
crimes that constitute violations of the Geneva Conventions or the Genocide and Torture
Conventions. The granting of amnesties to such persons would constitute a violation of the
state’s absolute obligations under these conventions to prosecute criminals accused of violating
these international conventions. In such a case, while the grant of a blanket amnesty may be
more politically feasible, it could leave the host state in a difficult situation; the state is giving
amnesties that it cannot legally grant under the state’s international obligations. This illustrates
one of the many difficulties that blanket amnesties may present. Because these blanket
amnesties are so legally deficient, the ICC may not be able to honor such blanket amnesties
when they contradict an obligation on the ICC to investigate a particular crime.
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It is important to distinguish between “blanket amnesties” and individual amnesties, as
the two practices are treated very differently in international law. Such amnesties may, like South
Africa’s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, grant amnesties to human rights
violators on the condition that they publicly admit to their crimes.73
Of interest to the present discussion are the amnesties given to Apartheid leaders in South
Africa during the 1990’s. These amnesties are particularly relevant because they addressed a
number of the issues that arise in determining whether amnesty should be granted to particular
individuals. In coming to a negotiated settlement, the parties to the dispute had to weigh their
interests in justice against their interests in democracy. In the end, the parities to the South
African dispute came to what could best be described as a negotiated amnesty-for-peace
settlement. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the South African government created a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission to evaluate the requests of individuals applying for amnesties
from the government.

B. Treatment of Amnesty by Previous Tribunals
1) ICTY - Yugoslavia
The ICTY statute does not explicitly recognize nor does it foreclose the possibility of an
amnesty exception to the ICTY’s jurisdiction. There are, however, a few provisions of the ICTY
statute into which an amnesty exception may be read. Articles 9 and 10 of the ICTY statute
provide the closest language into which a potential amnesty exception may be read.
Article 9 establishes the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY over “serious violations of
international humanitarian law” that were committed in the former Yugoslavia after January 1,
73
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1991.74 The ICTY may assert primary jurisdiction over national courts at its discretion.75 If the
ICTY so wishes, the ICTY may request that a domestic court defer to the ICTY in certain
cases.76 If the ICTY desired, the ICTY could request that a national court suspend their
proceedings to allow the ICTY to take over the case. The primacy of the ICTY’s jurisdiction is
further affirmed in Article 10 of the ICTY Statute; a domestic court may not prosecute someone
who has already been tried by the tribunal.77 This may also mean that the ICTY could request
jurisdiction over a case before a national authority grants certain individuals amnesty or asylum.
Article 10 of the ICTY Statute incorporates the international concept of “non-bis-inidem.” Although the ICTY may assert primary jurisdiction over acts committed in the former
Yugoslavia after January 1, 1991, the ICTY must give deference to other courts in certain cases.
The ICTY is precluded from prosecuting an individual who has been previously tried by a
national court for “serious violations of international humanitarian law.”78 This does not apply
to every situation before the court. The principle of non-bis-in-idem only applies under the
ICTY when the accused individual has already been tried.79
This general rule is not without exception. The presumption against trying an individual
before the ICTY after the individual has been tried by a national court can be overcome if the act
for which the individual was tried was an ordinary crime or if the State proceedings were
74
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designed to shield the individual from international criminal liability.80 The second exemption
applies most directly to the issue of a potential amnesty exception to the ICTY’s jurisdiction. If
the proceedings at the domestic level were meant to shield an individual from being prosecuted
by international authorities, the ICTY may override those proceedings by submitting the
individual to proceedings before the ICTY.81 This provision allows the ICTY to override
amnesties or grants of asylum given in bad faith. The provision says nothing about allowing the
ICTY to honor those amnesties at their discretion.
The ICTY has held that the grant of an amnesty does not preclude prosecution for torture
by either the ICTY or other international tribunals. In convicting Anto Furundzija of committing
acts of torture against a woman in 1993, the trial chamber theorized that acts of torture could not
be absolved through domestic grants of amnesty.82 The trial chamber held, “in spite of possible
national authorization by legislative or judicial bodies to violate the principle banning torture,
individuals remain bound to comply with that principle.” 83
If the Prosecutor has been given the power to honor amnesties or grants of asylum at his
or her discretion, such a grant of power may be read into Article 18 of the Rome Statute. Article
18 gives the Prosecutor the power to decide whether there is sufficient basis to initiate
proceedings only after assessing all relevant information.84 These provisions notwithstanding,
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the ICTY Statute gives very little guidance in determining whether there is an amnesty or asylum
exception to the jurisdiction of the ICTY Statute.

2) SCSL - Sierra Leone
The Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone does not adopt the approach to amnesty
and asylum treatment endorsed by the ICTY. Article 23 of the Special Court Statute recognizes
pardons only if the President of the Special Court decides that granting the pardon would serve
“the interests of justice and the general principles of law.”85 This does not mean that an amnesty
automatically precludes prosecution before the Special Court. Instead, the Statute of the Special
Court is very explicit in rejecting an amnesty exception to the Court’s jurisdiction: “An amnesty
granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court…shall not be a bar to
prosecution.”86 The Special Court’s rejection of an amnesty exception to the Special Court’s
jurisdiction is clear and unambiguous.
The Special Court had to address the issue of grants of amnesty early in the court’s
formation. Pursuant to an amnesty for peace deal negotiated by the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General, members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were granted amnesty
and a truth commission was established.87 There was an important distinction regarding the
scope of the amnesty grants; the grants of amnesty were only to apply to Sierra Leone courts
applying Sierra Leone law.88 Since the amnesties applied only to domestic proceedings, the
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amnesties were ineffective against the jurisdiction of the Special Court, because the Special
Court was a hybrid court, not a domestic court.89 The Appeals Chamber for the Special Court
affirmed this distinction in their decision on a preliminary motion for lack of jurisdiction in the
Special Court’s case against Morris Kallon.90 Despite the Lome Agreement’s amnesty grants, the
amnesty grants themselves do not preclude prosecution by the Special Court because the
amnesty grants only applied to domestic prosecutions by domestic courts.91
But does this provision impose an obligation on the Special Court to prosecute
individuals notwithstanding their grants of amnesty? It is evident that a grant of amnesty is not
dispositive against prosecution by the Special Court, but does this mean that the Special Court is
obligated to initiate investigations or prosecute violations when amnesty has been given? The
Statute is not altogether clear on this issue. Article 1 of the Special Court Statute grants the
tribunal the power to prosecute individuals with the greatest liability, but the Statute says nothing
about an obligation to proceed with such prosecutions.92 The Prosecutor has been given the
power to prosecute at the Prosecutor’s discretion; if the drafters of the Statute had intended for
the Statute to impose an absolute obligation on the Prosecutor to prosecute certain crimes, the
language of the statute might very well have been different. The drafters could have said that the
Prosecutor shall prosecute all cases of violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra
Leone, or that the Prosecutor is obligated to prosecute all violations whether or not the
individuals have been given amnesty. The fact that the provision is creatively ambiguous is

89

Id.

90

Appeals Chamber, “Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty,” Special Court for Sierra
Leone, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

91

Id.

92

Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra 86, at art. 1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 8].

32

noteworthy; clearly the Court wanted to foreclose the potential for amnesty as an affirmative
defense, but it is not altogether clear whether the Prosecution may honor such a grant of amnesty
or whether the Prosecutor is bound to prosecute.

C. Statutory Analysis
The Rome Statute does not explicitly determine whether an amnesty exception to the
ICC’s jurisdiction exists. Indeed, it is acknowledged that no consensus could be reached among
the drafters of the Rome Statute regarding amnesties under the ICC.93 The rules of evidence and
procedure for the ICC do not provide any further guidance.94 The Rome Statute, however, is
creatively ambiguous. There are a number of provisions of the Rome Statute into which an
amnesty exception may be implied.
In order to understand the obligations on the Office of the Prosecutor regarding
investigations and prosecutions, it is instructive to analyze Articles 15 and 53 of the Rome
Statute. Article 15 establishes the procedures with which the OTP is required to comply. Of
interest are the second and third clauses of Article 15, which establish the basis for prosecutorial
discretion: the Prosecutor must “analyse the seriousness of the information received” under
clause 2 and then must determine whether there is a “reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation.”95

93

Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Relevance of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court for Amnesties and
Truth Commissions, 7 Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 553, 561 (2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 30].

94

Id. This passage refers indirectly to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the ICC.

95

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 1, at art. 15, cl.2-3. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].

33

Article 53 governs the initiation of investigations. Article 53 establishes the obligation
on the Prosecutor to request initiation of an investigation unless the Prosecutor determines that
there is no reasonable basis to carry out further proceedings.96 Under the first clause of Article
53, the Prosecutor must determine whether a reasonable basis exists by considering three factors:
whether there is a reasonable basis to determine that a crime has been committed, whether the
case would be inadmissible under Article 17, and whether the initiation of an investigation would
not serve the interests of justice.97 The second clause of Article 53 establishes similar
requirements on the Prosecutor regarding the initiation of prosecutions. The Prosecutor must
consider whether there is a sufficient legal or factual basis to proceed with a prosecution,
whether the case is inadmissible under Article 17, and whether a prosecution would violate the
interests of justice.98 If the prosecutor determines that there is a “reasonable basis to proceed”
under article 53 and finds that initiating such an investigation would not violate the issues of
admissibility outlined in Article 17, the prosecutor may make a request to initiate an
investigation.99

1) Article 17 - Admissibility
The Prosecutor’s analysis under his or her Article 53 discretion will depend in large part
on Article 17 of the Rome Statute. Under Article 17(1), a case is inadmissible if it is being
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investigated or has been investigated by a state that has jurisdiction over the case.100 Therefore,
for the purposes of analyzing amnesties under Article 17(1), it must be determined whether the
grant of amnesty is equivalent to a domestic investigation.
To analyze the sufficiency of a grant of amnesty under Article 17(1), the distinction
between blanket amnesties and individual amnesties that were granted pursuant to a truth and
reconciliation commission’s findings must be emphasized. Blanket amnesties are given without
regard to individual case-by-case investigations. It seems clear that blanket amnesties, by their
very nature, would not qualify as sufficient investigations under Article 17(1).
There is more room to argue that amnesties granted on the basis of individualized
proceedings, such as those granted through truth and reconciliation commissions, qualify as
sufficient investigations under Article 17. To determine whether truth and reconciliation
commissions qualify as investigations under Article 17, a two-part analysis must be conducted.
First, it must be determined whether or not the process constitutes a sufficient
investigation under Article 17(1). In making such a determination, it is necessary to consider
whether or not a TRC must constitute a criminal investigation. There is some question over
whether intent to conduct a criminal investigation with an intent to prosecute the individual is a
requirement under Article 17(1). An analysis of the text, however, seems to indicate that noncriminal investigations are not precluded from inclusion under Article 17(1); there is no explicit
requirement that the investigation must arise to the level of a preliminary criminal investigation.
Article 17(1)(a) allows for either prosecutions or investigations by individual States.101 The only
requirement that the investigation may have to satisfy is an inherent genuineness standard; it has
100
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been suggested that Article 17(1)(b) refers to investigations leading to “bona fide” decisions not
to prosecute.102
A second level of analysis must be conducted. Article 17(1)(a) includes the provision
that if “the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution,”
the domestic investigation is considered inadequate for admissibility purposes.103 The analysis
then turns to Article 17(2). Under Article 17(2), it is for the ICC to determine whether
conducting a TRC indicates an intent to shield the individual from prosecution, an unjustified
delay or an unwillingness on the part of the State to carry out a genuine prosecution of the
individual. If it is determined that the State is unwilling to carry out a genuine investigation of
the individual, the ICC may be obligated to assert jurisdiction in the case under the principle of
complimentarity. 104
To determine whether a State investigation is sufficiently genuine under Article 17(2), it
is instructive to consider whether Article 17(2) requires a criminal investigation. There is no
explicit requirement under Article 17(2) that the investigation be conducted with a basis to
conduct criminal prosecutions. All Article 17(2) refers to is whether a state is “unwilling” to
prosecute in a particular case. Article 17(2) could be read to define willingness in regards to the
motives of the State conducting the investigation. If it is shown that the State’s intent is to shield
the individual from prosecution, to produce an unjustified delay or conduct general procedures
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inconsistent with an intent to effect justice, the State is “unwilling” to prosecute the case.105
Therefore, to satisfy Article 17(2) inadmissibility, a case must be conducted with a genuine
purpose indicating a willingness to bring the individual to justice.
In regards to reading grants of amnesty or asylum under Article 17(2) inadmissibility, the
grant of amnesty or asylum must be evaluated in terms of whether there was a genuine intent to
bring the individual to justice. It seems clear that amnesties granted pursuant to TRC
proceedings indicates a genuine intent to effect justice. In a TRC, the State is conducting
individualized proceedings that determine whether future action is necessary.
The amnesty analysis is unclear in regards to amnesty for peace deals. When a State
negotiates an amnesty for peace agreement, is this negotiation a manifestation of a genuine intent
to produce justice? It should follow that in order for an amnesty for peace deal to be considered
an intent to bring an individual to justice, the agreement should be conducted with the intent to
promote the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.106 Furthermore, the preservation of
amnesty for peace serves the interests of international policy. Amnesty for peace deals may
promote the purposes and principles of the UN Charter by preserving international peace and
security. Amnesty for peace deals, however, must be given on an individual basis to qualify as
sufficient investigations under Article 17. If an amnesty for peace agreement is negotiated for a
wide class or group of persons, such an agreement would amount to a blanket amnesty, which is
not a sufficient investigation under Article 17.
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Therefore, an individual amnesty for peace agreement may be considered a manifestation
of a genuine intent to produce justice, and the Office of the Prosecutor may decline an
investigation on this basis.
In light of the foregoing analysis, an amnesty given pursuant to a truth and reconciliation
commission proceeding may be considered a sufficient investigation arising to Article 17
inadmissibility. This would mean that the Office of the Prosecutor could decline an investigation
so long as a truth and reconciliation proceeding is taking place or has already taken place. In
regards to blanket amnesties, such widespread amnesties are inconsistent with the requirement
that a state conduct genuine investigations or prosecutions. Therefore, a grant of blanket
amnesty to a class or group of persons would not be considered a genuine investigation under
Article 17.

2) Article 16 – Action by the Security Council
It has been suggested that in regards to the interpretation of an amnesty exception, Article
16 of the Rome Statute may be the most important provision in the Rome Statute.107 Article 16
establishes that the OTP could not institute proceedings against an individual for twelve months
if the UN Security Council requests the OTP to make such a deferral.108 Furthermore, Article 16
allows the UN Security Council to renew that request for deferral at its discretion.109 This
provision allows the UN Security Council to introduce its Chapter VII powers in dealing with the
ICC. This provision of the Rome Statute allows the UN Security Council to take action
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regarding specific individual investigations, or even classes of investigations, limited only by
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Under the UN Charter, the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII powers in the event of a
threat to international security.110 The Security Council could justify actions ordering an
amnesty to be honored under Article 39 of the UN Charter if the UN Security Council
determines that such an order is an appropriate measure “to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”111
Other provisions of the UN Charter may be invoked. Furthermore, the UN Security
Council could conceivably order the State parties to a particular dispute to respect a Security
Council-mandated grant of amnesty to individual defendants under the Security Council’s
Article 40 powers.112 This provision of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council to mandate
that the State parties involved with a particular conflict “comply with such provisional measures
as (the Security Council) deems necessary or desirable.”113 It could be read into Article 41 of the
Rome Statute that the UN Security Council has been given the power to take measures
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amounting to grants of amnesty under the Security Council’s power to “decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.”114 The Security
Council’s Article 41 powers may be read in conjunction with its Article 42 powers to ensure that
its orders are enforced.115
These wide discretionary powers given to the Security Council may not necessarily be
dispositive of a Security Council right to end an investigation or prosecution through Security
Council resolution. It has been suggested that these powers given to the Security Council are not
a blank check for the Security Council to order widespread compliance with their orders. Rather,
the Security Council provisions of the UN Charter are “enumerated limited powers subject to the
rule of law.”116 The legal effect of these provisions may be that the ICC would not have to
submit to a Security Council ordering the ICC to honor a grant of amnesty if the grant of
amnesty violates international law.117
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It seems evident that although the UN Security Council has broad power to enforce the
honoring of a grant of amnesty under its powers granted by the UN Charter, the exercise of those
powers cannot violate international law.
3) Article 20 – Ne-Bis-In-Idem
The Rome Statute also recognizes the international law principle of “ne-bis-in-idem.”
Article 20 of the Rome Statute provides that an individual cannot be tried before the ICC if the
individual has been previously convicted or acquitted by the ICC for the same conduct.118
Article 20 also gives protection to individuals who have been previously tried by other courts for
violations of Articles 6, 7, or 8 of the Rome Statute.119 Under the third clause of Article 20, the
ICC cannot prosecute individuals who have been previously tried by “another court.”120 The
question arises as to what constitutes “another court.” The inclusion of the word “court” would
seem to indicate this provision applies strictly to actions of judicial bodies and not political
bodies. Further issues arise, regarding truth commissions like those established in South Africa.
Does a truth commission constitute “another court” under the definition provided by the Rome
Statute? One commentator suggests that truth commissions do not constitute courts for the
purposes of Article 20 interpretation.121
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Article 20 does grant two exceptions to the ne-bis-in-idem principle under which the
principle may be preempted. The third clause provides that the ne-bis-in-idem principle may be
preempted if either the previous proceedings were conducted for the purpose of shielding the
defendant from prosecution by the ICC or if the previous proceedings were not conducted in
accordance with international norms of due process.122 Under these provisions, if the ICC
decides that the proceedings leading to a grant of amnesty, for example, were for the purpose of
protecting a defendant from criminal liability or were otherwise violative of international norms
of due process, the ICC could preempt the ne-bis-in-idem principle and assert jurisdiction over
the individual at the Court’s discretion.
The question remains whether the ICC has an obligation to assert jurisdiction over certain
cases that may preempt the Ne Bis In Idem principle. One could argue that the only obligations
to prosecute individuals who have been granted amnesty arises when the decision to honor such
an amnesty would violate the expressed purposes of the UN Charter and the Rome Statute.123
Under this theory, the ICC could not initiate investigations or proceed with prosecutions where
doing so would violate the basic principles of UN and ICC organization. This determination
would have to be made at the Prosecutor’s and Pre-Trial Chamber’s discretion, but it certainly
provides the ICC with some flexibility under this Article of the Rome Statute.
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4) Article 119 – Settlement of Disputes
It could be argued that the question of whether an amnesty exception to the ICC exists,
and further whether there is an obligation to override that amnesty, is a question for the Court
itself to decide. Article 119 of the Rome Statute explicitly grants the Court the power to settle
disputes “concerning the judicial functions of the Court.”124 It could be further argued that if the
Court determines that this matter is not for the Court to decide, the matter should be referred to
the Assembly of States Parties.125 Upon receiving the matter, the Assembly may seek to settle
the dispute on its own or may further refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.126
Therefore, in the event that this matter regarding prosecutorial discretion and the amnesty
exception is determined to require outside counsel, the ICC may seek the counsel of the
Assembly of States Parties and, indirectly, the International Court of Justice.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF A POTENTIAL ASYLUM EXCEPTION TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. Granting Asylum – policy concerns
The treatment of asylum under constructions of international law is considerably different
than the treatment of grants of amnesty under international law. The most simple distinction
between the two can be made on the grounds that amnesty is explicitly addressed far more often
in the realm of international legal materials than are grants of asylum. This may be because
grants of asylum implicate different issues that may or may not be of interest to the ICC.
Furthermore, the Rome Statute does not address asylum with the same clarity as it addresses
grants of amnesties.
The legacy of asylum is characterized by conceptions that political connections can
somehow help international criminals escape liability.127 In situations where international
criminals commit crimes for professed political goals, there is the conception that the criminal
may escape criminal liability by claiming status as a “political prisoner” of sorts.
International asylum law is generally treated under the analysis of international refugee
law. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to the
Convention are the primary authorities on international asylum law. These instruments
notwithstanding, the realm of international asylum law is generally unsettled. Grants of asylum
are not specifically addressed in either the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or
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the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.128 Therefore, determining the status of an
asylum-seeking individual requires analysis of different conventions of international law.
The chief principle of international asylum is the notion of non-refoulement.129 Under
the theory of non-refoulement, no recognized refugee will be sent back to the country from
which they came if doing so may expose the refugee to persecution, political, ethnic, or
otherwise.130 Article 33(1) of the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention”) codifies the non-refoulement principle as an accepted rule of international law.131
Furthermore, the principle of non-refoulement has come to be recognized as a norm of
customary international law. Domestic judicial bodies have recognized the non-refoulement
principle as well. In late 2000, the United Kingdom’s House of Lords affirmed the UK Secretary
of State’s refusal to extradite two asylum seekers on the principle that returning the individuals
to their respective countries would subject them to a risk of persecution.132
The non-refoulement principle, however, is not afforded to all refugees without
exception. Article 33(2) provides an exception to non-refoulement for refugees who present a
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danger to either the national security or the community of the asylum state.133 Furthermore, the
benefits of the Refugee Convention do not extend to people whom there is reason to believe have
committed war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against humanity pursuant to Article 1F of
the Refugee Convention.134
The ongoing debate over the appropriate legal treatment of deposed Liberian President
Charles Taylor adequately illustrates the unsettled state of international asylum law. Charles
Taylor stands accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions.135 Taylor’s regime dated back to the Liberian elections of 1997, but the Special
Court’s indictment was limited to acts committed since August 2000. Mr. Taylor stepped down
from the Liberian Presidency in August 2003, and he subsequently accepted an offer of asylum
from Nigerian President Olusegun Obsasnjo.136 Counsel for Charles Taylor attempted to assert
head-of-state immunity in making a motion to seta aside his arrest, to quash his indictment and to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Special Court with regards to Mr. Taylor’s case.137 In
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dismissing Mr. Taylor’s motion, the Special Court asserted that Mr. Taylor’s assertion of head of
state immunity did not preclude the ICC from asserting jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor.138

B. Treatment of Asylum by Previous Tribunals
Unfortunately, the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone do not provide much
guidance regarding the treatment of grants of asylum. Most case law on the subject has arisen
out of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, most of the issues
regarding asylum law addressed cases that bear little resemblance to cases of present concern.139
In this regard, any case addressing the treatment of asylum under international criminal
jurisdiction will be a case of first impression.
The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol provide some direction, but neither
document addresses asylum explicitly. It is clear under the Convention and the Protocol,
however, that an individual may be denied the protection of the Refugee Conventions where the
individual would otherwise qualify as a refugee under the Convention. Article 1(F) of the 1951
Convention outlines some of the scenarios in which the protections of the Refugee Convention
would no longer apply to an otherwise qualified refugee. Article 1(F) provides that the
convention will not apply to individuals for whom there are “serious reasons” to believe that the
individual has done one of three things. First, if there is reason to believe that the individual has
committed a war crime, a crime against peace, or a crime against humanity.140 Second, the
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Refugee Convention will not apply if there is reason to believe the individual has committed a
“serious non-political crime” in a location outside the country of refuge.141 Third, the
Convention will not apply if the individual has been found guilty of activities that violate the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.142
It seems clear that under Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the protections of
the Convention would not apply to an individual such as Charles Taylor. Mr. Taylor’s protection
under the Convention would be preempted by Article 1(F)(a) as Mr. Taylor has been indicted on
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These exclusion clauses of the 1951
Convention provide the Prosecutor of the ICC with the ability to preempt grants of amnesty in
deciding whether to initiate an investigation.

C. Statutory Analysis
Much like amnesty, a grant of asylum is not an explicit exception to the ICC’s
jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, it would be difficult to argue
that a grant of asylum qualifies under Article 17(1) as a legitimate investigation or judicial
proceeding making the case inadmissible under subsections (b) and (c). Therefore, if there is to
be a recognized asylum exception to ICC jurisdiction, it must be read into another provision of
the Rome Statute. Finding such a provision that allows such an interpretation, however, is
slightly attenuated.
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If a grant of asylum is to be recognized as a basis for declining or delaying the initiation of an
investigation, it will most likely have to be read into the grants of prosecutorial discretion under
Article 53.
Although the Rome Statute is less than clear in its treatment of asylum in regards to ICC
jurisdiction, the ICC may have a direct effect on grants of asylum to persons accused of
international law violations. The Prosecutor of the ICC may be able to delay initiating an
investigation against an individual if the status of that individual as a refugee is legally
undetermined. If the ICC requests an individual to surrender him or herself to the jurisdiction of
the court, the asylum laws of some countries would forbid the transfer of the individual to the
jurisdiction of the court under the theory that the individual would be sent to a location where the
individual risks persecution. As such, this finding may delay domestic procedures to determine
whether a particular individual should be granted asylum. This delay in the determination of an
individual’s refugee status would have a freezing effect on ICC procedures; the ability of the
ICC to initiate an investigation into such an individual would be delayed so long as the domestic
asylum procedures have not been finished.143
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V.

CONCLUSION
Given the ICC’s status as an multinational judicial body, there are very few obligations

regarding ICC jurisdiction imposed by those international conventions. The Geneva
Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and the Torture Convention all impose absolute
obligations to prosecute violations of those conventions, but those obligations do not apply to
multinational, non-party judicial bodies such as the ICC. The Rome Statute does not explicitly
recognize an amnesty exception to the ICC’s jurisdiction, but there are a number of provisions
into which an implied amnesty exception may easily be read. In regards to grants of asylum, the
Rome Statute does not explicitly recognize such an exception for asylum. Unlike grants of
amnesty, there are very few provisions of the Rome Statute into which an asylum exception may
be implied. The Refugee Convention may provide some flexibility, as might the ICC
Prosecutor’s wide powers of prosecutorial discretion, but reading a wide asylum exception into
the ICC’s jurisdiction is attenuated at best.
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